International Negotiation Management in US–Iran Talks: HRM Analysis of Pressure and Compromise

Abstract

This study examines how International Negotiation Management in the US–Iran talks produces pressure and enables compromise through an HRM-based analytical lens. The central problem is that existing negotiation scholarship inadequately explains how negotiators handle persistent political and institutional constraints to reach workable agreements. The study aims to identify the HRM mechanisms that mediate pressure management and the construction of compromise in the US–Iran context. Methodologically, it applies a literature-based study using document analysis and content analysis to synthesize relevant scholarly and institutional sources. Data consist of primary and secondary literature addressing US–Iran negotiations and conceptual themes of negotiation pressure, bargaining behavior, and HRM dynamics. The study concludes that compromise emerges when negotiation teams are supported by HRM-like practices—clear roles and coordination, competent selection, crisis-oriented training, consistent communication routines, accountability and performance logic, incentive alignment, and structured legal-technical support.