



## International Negotiation Management in US–Iran Talks: HRM Analysis of Pressure and Compromise

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### Abstract

This study examines how International Negotiation Management in the US–Iran talks produces pressure and enables compromise through an HRM-based analytical lens. The central problem is that existing negotiation scholarship inadequately explains how negotiators handle persistent political and institutional constraints to reach workable agreements. The study aims to identify the HRM mechanisms that mediate pressure management and the construction of compromise in the US–Iran context. Methodologically, it applies a literature-based study using document analysis and content analysis to synthesize relevant scholarly and institutional sources. Data consist of primary and secondary literature addressing US–Iran negotiations and conceptual themes of negotiation pressure, bargaining behavior, and HRM dynamics. The study concludes that compromise emerges when negotiation teams are supported by HRM-like practices—clear roles and coordination, competent selection, crisis-oriented training, consistent communication routines, accountability and performance logic, incentive alignment, and structured legal-technical support.



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### INTRODUCTION

International negotiations have increasingly become decisive arenas for shaping regional stability, economic security, and international legitimacy. Among the most consequential cases are the US–Iran talks, where negotiation dynamics have repeatedly influenced issues such as nuclear limitations, sanctions, diplomatic engagement, and long-term compliance arrangements. In real-world practice, these talks have often faced a persistent tension between political pressure and the need to reach workable compromises. This tension does not only emerge from the content of the agenda—such as verification mechanisms, timelines, or sanctions relief—but also from the way negotiators manage constraints, internal decision-making processes, and inter-state bargaining strategies. As a result, the problem is not simply whether agreements are possible, but how negotiation management is organized when both parties operate under domestic and international pressure. This situation is further complicated by frequent shifts in leadership, changing public expectations, and the strategic use of leverage by each side. Therefore, an analytical focus is required

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to understand the negotiation system itself—how pressure is generated and handled, and how compromise is negotiated and institutionalized during US–Iran engagement (Kubíček, 2024).

Although scholarship on international negotiation provides valuable concepts—such as bargaining power, credible commitment, signaling, and coercive diplomacy—these frameworks do not fully explain the internal human resource management dimensions of pressure and compromise in the specific context of US–Iran talks. Existing literature often emphasizes macro-level variables, including international law constraints, sanctions effectiveness, and strategic incentives, while giving less attention to how negotiation teams and organizations translate pressure into actionable decision processes. In addition, even when Human Resource Management (HRM) is mentioned in negotiation studies, it is frequently treated generically (e.g., leadership quality or communication) rather than examined through a structured HRM lens, such as role design, performance management under risk, motivation systems, or mechanisms for managing stress and accountability among negotiators. Consequently, key aspects—such as how negotiators are selected, trained, supported, and evaluated under hostile or uncertain conditions—remain under-theorized in relation to compromise outcomes. This creates a literature gap: the field has not yet sufficiently integrated International Negotiation Management with an HRM analysis capable of clarifying how pressure becomes negotiation behavior and how compromise emerges as an organizationally managed outcome (Patel, 2025).

Accordingly, this study aims to examine International Negotiation Management in the US–Iran talks by conducting a Human Resource Management (HRM) analysis of pressure and compromise. Specifically, the research seeks to identify how negotiation-related pressures—originating from political leadership, public opinion, institutional constraints, and international scrutiny—are managed through HRM-oriented processes within negotiation systems. The study also aims to explore how compromise is operationalized, not merely as a bargaining result, but as a product of managed coordination, decision alignment, and organizational coping strategies among negotiators. Through this objective, the research intends to connect negotiation theory with HRM mechanisms that shape negotiation conduct, such as how negotiators manage uncertainty, how responsibilities are distributed and reinforced, and how institutional incentives influence willingness to adjust positions. By focusing on pressure and compromise as interrelated outcomes of negotiation management, the study seeks to clarify the pathways through which negotiation teams transform constrained environments into structured bargaining actions. Ultimately, the research objective is to provide a more explanatory model for understanding why agreements progress—or stall—within the distinctive institutional and political context of US–Iran diplomacy (Shethiya, 2024).

This research is important for both academic and practical reasons. Academically, it addresses a notable gap by integrating International Negotiation Management concepts with an HRM-based perspective on negotiation behavior. Such integration matters because negotiations are not executed by abstract states alone; they are implemented through people, roles, and organizational systems that respond to pressure in real time. Practically, understanding the HRM dynamics of negotiation pressure and compromise can inform how governments and diplomatic institutions design negotiation teams, structure decision accountability, and build support mechanisms that sustain constructive engagement under stress. In contexts where political costs are high and missteps can trigger escalation, the management of human performance becomes a strategic variable rather than a background condition. The findings of this study are therefore expected to contribute insights for policymakers and diplomatic trainers on how to better prepare negotiators for high-pressure bargaining environments and how to institutionalize compromise without undermining credibility. By aligning the research contribution with the stated objective, this study offers a structured explanation of negotiation management that may improve the effectiveness

and sustainability of future international engagements, including—but not limited to—the US–Iran context (Ali, 2022).

## **METHOD**

This study is designed as a qualitative inquiry using a focused case phenomenon: the international negotiation process between the United States and Iran, particularly as reflected in episodes of bargaining, escalation risks, and eventual efforts toward compromise. The object of analysis is the negotiation management dynamic—specifically how pressure is produced, communicated, and managed, and how compromise is constructed under constraints imposed by domestic politics, sanctions frameworks, international scrutiny, and shifting diplomatic leverage. The US–Iran context is chosen because it illustrates a high-pressure bargaining environment where negotiators must operate with uncertainty, asymmetric commitments, and recurring cycles of delay or breakdown. In such conditions, negotiation performance is rarely driven only by formal policy positions; it is influenced by institutional coordination, human decision-making, team preparation, and mechanisms that sustain negotiation consistency. Therefore, the research concentrates on the “negotiation management” dimension as an organizational and strategic practice, rather than treating the talks merely as diplomatic events. By centering on pressure and compromise, the study seeks to trace how negotiation behavior and outcomes are shaped through structured management processes that involve roles, accountability, and internally regulated decision logic within negotiation teams (Al-Atawi, 2024).

Type of research and data sources: literature study

This research adopts a literature-based study (studi kepustakaan) as its methodological foundation. Because the study examines negotiation management in the US–Iran talks and aims to conduct an HRM analysis of pressure and compromise, the available evidence is best captured through documented scholarly and institutional materials rather than field observation. The primary data in this study are derived from relevant literature directly addressing the negotiation context and the conceptual elements of pressure and compromise, including works that discuss US–Iran diplomatic engagement, negotiation bargaining processes, coercive or constrained diplomacy, and frameworks that link negotiation strategy to human organizational factors. In addition, the study uses secondary data composed of complementary literature that deepens understanding of the HRM lens applied to negotiation settings. These materials include books, peer-reviewed journal articles, conference papers, policy reports, and other scientific works that are aligned with the keywords and themes of the research: *International Negotiation Management, US–Iran Talks (Pressure & Compromise)*, and *HRM Analysis*. By relying on both primary and secondary literary sources, the study ensures that its conceptual claims are grounded in existing academic debate while also being supported by well-documented institutional and analytical accounts. This approach enables the research to systematically synthesize evidence and build an interpretable explanatory narrative (Sundar, 2025).

Theoretical foundations: sources and assumptions

The study is guided by theoretical foundations that inform how negotiation pressure is managed and how compromise is formed as an outcome of structured negotiation behavior. The first theoretical foundation derives from Negotiation Theory, particularly bargaining and strategic interaction approaches that explain how parties respond to leverage, incentives, and constraints during high-stakes negotiations. This theoretical strand is supported by classical and widely cited concepts

originating from scholars such as Roger Fisher and William Ury through principled negotiation ideas, especially the distinction between positions and interests and the importance of designing agreements that are feasible under pressure. To complement this, the study also draws from theories of credible commitment and signaling, which explain how parties behave under uncertainty and how negotiation credibility is maintained to prevent opportunistic shifts. In parallel, the HRM foundation of the study is anchored in Human Resource Management and organizational behavior perspectives, where performance under stress, role clarity, and accountability mechanisms are treated as organizational tools for producing consistent decision behavior. Within this HRM orientation, the research adopts assumptions that negotiation outcomes are affected by how negotiation teams are organized, prepared, and managed—such as through selection of personnel, training for crisis bargaining, motivation and incentive structures, and mechanisms to manage risk and responsibility. By integrating these perspectives, the study uses theory not only as a conceptual reference but also as an interpretive framework to identify patterns of pressure management and compromise construction in the documented negotiation records (Kougioumtzidis et al., 2025).

### Research process and data collection technique

The research process is conducted through a structured literature review workflow designed to systematically collect and organize relevant information. First, the study identifies key written sources—books, journal articles, policy documents, academic theses, and reputable reports—that relate to US–Iran negotiation engagement and to the conceptual themes of pressure, leverage, bargaining behavior, and compromise. Second, the study filters the literature to ensure that the selected sources are directly relevant to the research focus and that they provide explanatory detail on negotiation management practices. Third, the study performs careful reading and annotation to extract information relevant to HRM variables embedded in negotiation contexts, such as team organization, internal coordination, leadership influence, decision accountability, preparedness, communication routines, and stress-related constraints. The data collection technique therefore relies on document-based research, meaning that the “field” of evidence is the written record. Through reading and synthesis of multiple sources—including prior research, analytical papers, diplomatic summaries, and scholarly commentaries—the study compiles a corpus of materials that can be compared across themes. This process ensures that the analysis is not based on isolated narratives but on cross-referenced evidence patterns derived from a range of academic and institutional documentation (Doskenov & Okuyelu, 2025).

### Data analysis technique: content analysis

The study applies content analysis as its data analysis technique to interpret and synthesize the collected literature systematically. Content analysis is used to examine how pressure and compromise are described, operationalized, and linked to negotiation management practices within the US–Iran context. The process begins with organizing the extracted textual evidence into thematic categories corresponding to the study’s key concepts, such as forms of pressure (political, institutional, sanctions-related, and public scrutiny), mechanisms of negotiation management (coordination, delegation, credibility management, decision alignment), and manifestations of compromise (adjustment of positions, procedural agreements, timing strategies, and implementation planning). Next, the study conducts close reading to identify meaningful patterns, relationships, and recurring rationales expressed across sources. These patterns are then interpreted through the theoretical framework to determine how HRM-oriented dynamics—such as role design,

support systems for negotiators, performance under uncertainty, accountability structures, and preparation routines—may explain negotiation behavior under pressure. Finally, the analysis produces synthesized findings by connecting evidence-based themes to the study’s explanatory purpose: to clarify how negotiation teams manage constraints and transform pressure into structured compromise. Through this approach, content analysis enables the research to move from descriptive literature review to a more analytical HRM-oriented interpretation of negotiation management (Hady et al., 2025).

## **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

### **Result**

The literature review indicates that pressure in US–Iran talks operates as a multi-layered constraint rather than a single external force. Across diplomatic analyses and negotiation scholarship, pressure is consistently described as emerging from intertwined sources: domestic political scrutiny, sanctions regimes and their enforcement risks, international monitoring, and leadership volatility. In the US–Iran case, pressure also intensifies due to the strategic value of signaling—both states must demonstrate resolve without allowing the other party to interpret every concession as weakness. This creates a negotiation environment where bargaining is not purely about policy content, but about managing perceptions in real time. The reviewed materials show that negotiators face a continuous dilemma: maintain a credible posture while still leaving room for bargaining space. As a result, negotiation management becomes fundamentally HRM-relevant, because the ability to absorb pressure, interpret signals, and coordinate decisions depends on how negotiation teams are organized and supported. Therefore, the first result is that pressure functions as a persistent operational condition that shapes negotiation behavior, timelines, and communication styles in the US–Iran context (Khamaj & Ali, 2024).

A second result concerns the way negotiation teams are structured to handle pressure through role clarity and procedural coordination. Many sources emphasize that successful engagement requires a stable internal command system, including clear delegation of tasks and alignment of messaging between political leadership and technical negotiators. When role ambiguity exists, inconsistencies appear—such as mismatched statements between officials, delayed feedback loops, or contradictory interpretations of negotiation texts. In the US–Iran literature, this problem is reflected in episodes where negotiations progressed procedurally but faced setbacks due to unclear responsibility allocation for verification, compliance interpretation, or sequencing. From an HRM standpoint, these patterns suggest that negotiation management relies on organizational design: teams must know who decides what, which unit verifies information, and how changes to positions are approved. The evidence indicates that when teams are organized with strong procedural coordination, they can convert external pressure into manageable internal workflows. Thus, compromise becomes more feasible not only because of policy adjustments, but because HRM-oriented coordination stabilizes decision-making under stress (Wang & Yang, 2025).

The reviewed literature also reveals that selection of competent negotiators is repeatedly associated with improved handling of pressure. Even though many studies focus on state-level bargaining power, several accounts implicitly show that human capability matters: negotiators who possess domain expertise in sanctions, verification, and legal compliance are better positioned to sustain credible commitments. In US–Iran talks, the complexity of technical requirements and the need to translate political instructions into operational terms increases the risk of misunderstandings. Where competence is uneven, negotiation texts may require repeated

clarification or re-negotiation, which can be interpreted externally as weakness or lack of seriousness. Consequently, pressure rises because parties anticipate delays or errors. The HRM lens helps explain why: selection affects how quickly teams can process sensitive information, respond to changing constraints, and draft feasible compromise language. Therefore, the third result is that the negotiation process is sensitive to the human competence composition of the bargaining team, which influences how pressure is processed and how bargaining momentum is maintained (Hakami et al., 2025).

Another key result is that training and preparation practices influence compromise construction by improving procedural resilience. Negotiation scholarship frequently argues that high-stakes talks require rehearsed communication routines, scenario planning, and internal simulations for likely rejection points. In the US–Iran context, the literature suggests that talks frequently include periods of stalled negotiations, followed by renewed movement after strategic recalibration. The HRM interpretation is that such recalibration is not accidental; it often reflects preparation systems—briefing materials, internal lesson-learning, and negotiation rehearsal—that enable teams to respond to pressure without collapsing into reactive bargaining. Sources discussing crisis diplomacy and bargaining under sanctions indicate that teams must prepare not only for substantive issues but also for reputational and credibility risks. When preparation systems are robust, negotiators can propose compromise options that remain implementable, rather than merely rhetorical. Hence, compromise is more likely when training creates stability in how negotiators interpret pressure and generate options within constraints (Mohammad, 2023).

The analysis further shows that communication routines—especially internal information flow—are critical in transforming pressure into negotiation behavior. Multiple works describe negotiations where messages are coordinated across levels (political leadership, policy analysts, legal teams, and technical experts). These routines affect whether the same “signal” is delivered consistently to the counterpart and whether negotiation positions remain internally coherent. In high-pressure settings, delays in internal feedback can create misalignment: one group may push for procedural concessions while another group insists on substantive conditions. The HRM perspective highlights that communication routines resemble organizational information systems: they reduce ambiguity, prevent contradictory instructions, and maintain a shared understanding of negotiation priorities. In the reviewed materials, moments of compromise frequently correspond to periods where internal coordination improved, allowing parties to converge on sequencing, verification standards, or phased relief mechanisms. Thus, the fifth result is that pressure management depends on HRM-like communication infrastructure that ensures negotiators act as an aligned team rather than isolated actors (Segun-Falade et al., 2024).

A sixth result involves accountability and performance monitoring mechanisms that shape negotiators’ willingness to adjust positions. The literature indicates that negotiators operate under intense external and internal evaluation: leadership expects progress, public opinion constrains rhetoric, and compliance risk creates fear of future blame. Such accountability pressures can produce either defensive rigidity or constructive flexibility, depending on how performance is defined and assessed. When success is measured only by short-term political wins, teams may avoid substantive compromise to protect credibility. Conversely, when evaluation includes process quality—such as achieving implementable sequencing, verification feasibility, and compliance clarity—teams may be more willing to accept carefully designed trade-offs. The HRM lens supports this: performance management systems influence risk behavior. The reviewed evidence suggests that compromise becomes more attainable when negotiators are evaluated for their ability to produce durable, verifiable outcomes rather than merely favorable headlines. Therefore, accountability structures are a decisive result variable linking pressure to compromise behavior (Ojika et al., 2022).

In addition, the evidence suggests that incentive alignment—between leadership goals and negotiation team priorities—affects negotiation compromise outcomes. US–Iran talks are characterized by conditional concessions, where each side must consider domestic political costs of any perceived retreat. The literature highlights how incentives are shaped by sanctions policy, diplomatic signaling requirements, and electoral or leadership timing. HRM analysis interprets these as organizational incentives: negotiation teams must perceive that compromise work will be supported rather than punished after the fact. If negotiators believe that leadership will later disown compromise adjustments, they will behave conservatively, delaying concessions. Conversely, when incentives align with compromise logic—such as phased verification milestones and shared benefits in the design of agreements—negotiators can pursue trade-offs with greater confidence. This results in compromise being not only negotiated between states, but effectively negotiated within the internal incentive structures of each negotiation system. Hence, the seventh result is that compromise depends on whether incentive systems make negotiated adjustments politically and organizationally “safe” for negotiators (Adekunle et al., 2021).

The literature also reveals that support mechanisms under stress—legal, technical, and psychosocial—contribute to negotiation durability. US–Iran negotiations require careful management of uncertainty: verification conditions, enforcement mechanisms, and interpretation of ambiguous clauses. When uncertainty becomes overwhelming, teams may experience fatigue, defensive thinking, or over-cautious bargaining. The HRM interpretation is that support systems function as buffers: legal support reduces fear of illegality, technical expertise reduces interpretation risk, and procedural support reduces decision fatigue. While many diplomatic accounts do not explicitly call this HRM, their descriptions of institutionalized expertise, drafting teams, and compliance review processes reflect HRM-like support structures. The evidence indicates that compromise becomes durable when negotiators are assisted in translating political language into operational commitments that can survive scrutiny. Thus, the eighth result is that negotiation pressure is mitigated through structured support capacity, which sustains engagement and supports compromise refinement (Wu et al., 2026).

Table 1: Pressure as Multi-Layered Constraint

Source of Pressure	Description	US-Iran Example	HRM Relevance
Domestic scrutiny	Political oversight from leaders/public	Leadership volatility signals resolve	Shapes team organization for real-time perception management
Sanctions/enforcement	Economic/compliance risks	Verification delays interpreted as weakness	Requires coordination to maintain bargaining space
International monitoring	Global observation of concessions	Signaling without appearing weak	Influences communication styles under persistent stress

Table 2: Team Structure and Role Clarity

Structural Element	Role in Handling Pressure	Common Issue in US-Iran Talks	HRM Benefit
Stable command system	Clear task delegation	Mismatched official statements	Converts pressure into workflows
Procedural coordination	Alignment of messaging	Unclear verification responsibilities	Stabilizes decisions for compromise
Feedback loops	Timely position approvals	Procedural progress with setbacks	Reduces inconsistencies

Table 3: Negotiator Selection and Competence

HRM Practice	Impact on Pressure	US-Iran Context	Outcome for Compromise
HRM Practice	Impact on Pressure	US-Iran Context	Outcome for Compromise
Competent selection	Domain expertise in sanctions/legal	Technical misunderstandings	Faster processing, sustained momentum
Training/simulations	Rehearsed routines for stalls	Strategic recalibration post-stall	Procedural resilience, feasible options
Scenario planning	Preparation for rejection points	Reputational risk management	Stability in option generation

Table 4: Communication Routines and Accountability

Mechanism	Function Under Pressure	US-Iran Example	Effect on Behavior
Internal info flow	Ensures alignment across teams	Coordinated signals on sequencing	Prevents misalignment, enables convergence
Performance monitoring	Defines success metrics	Evaluation for durable outcomes	Shifts from rigidity to flexibility
Incentive alignment	Makes compromise "safe"	Domestic costs of concessions	Encourages confident trade-offs

Table 5: Support Mechanisms

Support Type	Role in Mitigating Stress	US-Iran Application	Contribution to Durability
Legal/technical	Reduces uncertainty risks	Verification/enforcement clauses	Buffers against fatigue/errors

Psychosocial/procedural	Manages decision fatigue	Compliance review processes	Sustains engagement
Institutional expertise	Translates politics to operations	Drafting for scrutiny survival	Refines implementable commitments

**Discussion**

The results collectively suggest that International Negotiation Management can be more fully explained when Human Resource Management mechanisms are treated as causal mediators between external pressure and compromise outcomes. Conventional negotiation studies often emphasize bargaining power, signaling, and international constraints, but the US–Iran case shows that even when incentives exist, agreements progress unevenly due to human organizational dynamics. The HRM analysis clarifies “how” pressure is metabolized inside negotiation teams, rather than only “whether” pressure exists between states. By identifying selection, training, coordination, accountability, incentives, and support as practical HRM components, the study argues that negotiation performance is organizationally produced. This matters because pressure in US–Iran talks is persistent and not easily eliminated; therefore, states must rely on internal management systems to maintain bargaining functionality. The discussion emphasizes that compromise should be understood as a managed outcome: teams craft trade-offs that are feasible, verifiable, and politically defensible. Thus, the study advances an explanation that negotiation breakdown is not always a product of incompatible interests; it can also be a result of HRM misalignment—when teams are unable to sustain coherent decisions under constraint.

Why do HRM mechanisms matter so strongly in the US–Iran context? The answer lies in the high uncertainty and high reputational risk that characterize these talks. Negotiators must continuously process volatile information: leadership changes, sanctions enforcement dynamics, shifting regional events, and international scrutiny. Such an environment increases cognitive load and decision stress, which can cause rigidity, inconsistent messaging, and delays. HRM mechanisms become buffers against these effects. For example, role clarity reduces confusion during rapidly changing instructions, while training improves resilience when negotiations stall and require strategic recalibration. Communication routines prevent internal divergence that might translate into external contradictions. Consequently, HRM systems help transform pressure into stable negotiation behavior. This means that the effectiveness of diplomatic policy depends partly on organizational readiness: the capacity of teams to function as coordinated decision-making units under time pressure. Therefore, HRM is not merely an auxiliary factor; it becomes a structural requirement for negotiation continuity in a context like US–Iran where external conditions remain stressful even when bargaining intentions are present.

The study’s integration also has conceptual implications for how “compromise” should be defined in negotiation research. Many analyses treat compromise as an end-state—an agreement reached or concessions made—without sufficiently examining the internal organizational process through which compromise becomes possible. Through an HRM lens, compromise is reframed as a multi-stage achievement: negotiators must be able to generate options, justify trade-offs, and convert those trade-offs into implementable procedures under verification and compliance constraints. This reframing explains why compromises can appear suddenly after periods of stagnation: a temporary

resolution of internal coordination or support constraints can unlock a new bargaining pathway. Additionally, the findings suggest that compromise often reflects performance management logic—success criteria aligned to durable, verifiable outcomes rather than short-term political optics. This conceptual shift matters because it encourages future research to examine organizational performance indicators in negotiations, such as how teams handle drafting accuracy, sequencing feasibility, and compliance clarity. In doing so, negotiation studies can move from describing outcomes to modeling the institutional processes that make outcomes achievable.

From a practical standpoint, the findings imply that diplomatic institutions should treat negotiation team management as a strategic capability. If pressure management depends on selection, training, and coordination systems, then governments should institutionalize HRM practices for negotiation readiness. This includes selecting negotiators with both domain competence and stress tolerance, designing training programs focused on crisis bargaining and verification complexity, and building communication protocols that ensure internal alignment before external statements are issued. It also implies designing performance evaluation criteria that reward durable implementation design rather than merely rhetorical progress. The US–Iran case illustrates that compromise requires organizational legitimacy: negotiators need assurance that leadership will support compromise adjustments and that their reputational and political risk is managed. Therefore, institutions should implement structured support systems—legal and technical review mechanisms, compliance drafting teams, and scenario planning capacities. In short, the study suggests that international negotiation capacity is not only a function of national interest but also of how negotiation teams are managed as human systems.

The discussion also highlights limitations and boundary conditions of the literature-based approach. Because this study is conducted through a literature review, it relies on documented narratives and analytical accounts rather than direct observation or interviews with negotiation participants. As a result, HRM constructs are interpreted through textual evidence—such as descriptions of team roles, institutional processes, and negotiation sequencing logic—rather than through primary measurement of organizational practices. While content analysis enables systematic thematic extraction, future studies could strengthen validity through triangulation with archival materials, declassified documents, or qualitative interviews with former negotiators and advisors. Additionally, HRM mechanisms may operate differently depending on political structures, leadership styles, and institutional cultures in each country. Therefore, the proposed HRM–Negotiation Management connection should be understood as a theoretically grounded explanatory model, not as a universally deterministic formula. Nevertheless, even under these limitations, the pattern consistency across sources supports the plausibility of the HRM mediator role for pressure and compromise outcomes.

Ultimately, this study is intended to provide a foundation for improved negotiation scholarship and better negotiation practice. For scholarship, it offers an integrative analytical approach that links International Negotiation Management with HRM analysis, thereby expanding negotiation theory beyond bargaining power and into organizational capability. For practice, it offers actionable guidance for designing negotiation teams capable of functioning under prolonged pressure. By demonstrating how pressure is managed through HRM-like structures, the study supports governments in building sustainable diplomacy rather than relying on episodic diplomatic initiative. The findings also suggest an agenda for future research: examining how different HRM configurations correlate with negotiation durability, exploring whether incentive alignment can reduce defensive rigidity, and testing how communication protocols influence the timing of compromise. Therefore, the study contributes toward a more realistic understanding of international

negotiations—where agreements depend not only on what states want, but also on how negotiation human systems are prepared to produce, justify, and implement compromise under constraint.

## CONCLUSION

This study concludes that international negotiation outcomes in the US–Iran talks are not determined solely by external bargaining conditions, but are significantly shaped by International Negotiation Management through HRM-enabled processes that manage pressure and facilitate compromise. Based on a literature-based analysis, the research finds that pressure operates as a persistent, multi-source constraint affecting negotiator decision-making, messaging coherence, timelines, and credibility risks. Compromise emerges as an organizationally managed outcome when negotiation teams are supported by HRM-like mechanisms, including role clarity and coordination, competent selection, crisis and verification-oriented preparation, structured communication routines, meaningful accountability and performance evaluation, incentive alignment that protects negotiated adjustments, and legal-technical support systems that reduce uncertainty. Accordingly, the study advances the argument that negotiation success depends on how human systems are organized to transform constraint into feasible bargaining actions. In practical terms, the findings recommend that diplomatic institutions treat negotiation readiness as a strategic capability—designing negotiation teams and processes that can sustain constructive engagement under prolonged pressure.

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